CVE-2024-57973
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user.
Published Feb 27, 2025 · updated Oct 15, 2026 · linux linux kernel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
Code
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Timeline
Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.
Feb 27, 2025 · NIST NVD
Detected
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
Oct 15, 2026 · NIST NVD
Updated
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
Affected
- cpe linux/linux kernelversion unspecified
Sources
- CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2024-57973
Official CVE identifier
cve.org - FIRST EPSSExploitation probabilityCVE-2024-57973
30-day exploitation probability 0.7%
first.org - NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2024-57973
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_acc
nvd.nist.gov