Findings

CVE-2024-57973

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user.

Published Feb 27, 2025 · updated Oct 15, 2026 · linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Feb 27, 2025 · NIST NVD

    Detected

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.

  2. Oct 15, 2026 · NIST NVD

    Updated

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.

Affected

  • cpe linux/linux kernelversion unspecified

Sources

  • CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2024-57973

    Official CVE identifier

    cve.org
  • FIRST EPSSExploitation probabilityCVE-2024-57973

    30-day exploitation probability 0.7%

    first.org
  • NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2024-57973

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_acc

    nvd.nist.gov

References

CVE-2024-57973 · ZeroDay Findings