CVE-2026-110724
In versions till , The default rate-limit key resolver, , derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the request header.
Published Oct 15, 2026 · updated Oct 15, 2026 · Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Connected Services Platform
In versions till , The default rate-limit key resolver, , derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
Code
The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.
Timeline
Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.
Oct 15, 2026 · NIST NVD
Detected
In versions till , The default rate-limit key resolver, , derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the
Oct 15, 2026 · NIST NVD
Updated
In versions till , The default rate-limit key resolver, , derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the
Affected
- vendor Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Connected Services Platformversion unspecified
Sources
- CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-110724
In versions till , The default rate-limit key resolver, , derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefor
cve.org - NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2026-110724
In versions till , The default rate-limit key resolver, , derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated ag
nvd.nist.gov