CVE-2026-31720
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size f_audio_complete() copies req->length byt…
Published May 1, 2026 · updated Jun 17, 2026 · linux linux kernel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack variable: u32 data = 0; memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length); req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path, which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write. Validate req->actual against the expected payload size for the supported control selectors and decode only the expected amount of data. This avoids copying a host-influenced length into a fixed-size stack object.
Code
The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.
Timeline
Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.
May 1, 2026 · NIST NVD
Detected
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack variable: u32 data = 0; memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length); req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path, which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write. Validate req->actual against the ex
Jun 17, 2026 · NIST NVD
Updated
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack variable: u32 data = 0; memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length); req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path, which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write. Validate req->actual against the ex
Affected
- cpe linux/linux kernelversion unspecified
- cpe linux/linux kernel7.0
Sources
- CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-31720
Official CVE identifier
cve.org - NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2026-31720
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack variable: u32 data = 0; memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length); req->length is deriv
nvd.nist.gov