Findings

CVE-2026-41299

OpenClaw before 2026.3.28 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the chat.send gateway method where ACP-only provenance fields are gated by self-declared cl…

Published Apr 21, 2026 · updated Jun 17, 2026 · openclaw openclaw

OpenClaw before 2026.3.28 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the chat.send gateway method where ACP-only provenance fields are gated by self-declared client metadata from WebSocket handshake rather than verified authorization state. Authenticated operator clients can spoof ACP identity labels and inject reserved provenance fields intended only for the ACP bridge by manipulating client metadata during connection.

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Apr 21, 2026 · NIST NVD

    Detected

    OpenClaw before 2026.3.28 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the chat.send gateway method where ACP-only provenance fields are gated by self-declared client metadata from WebSocket handshake rather than verified authorization state. Authenticated operator clients can spoof ACP identity labels and inject reserved provenance fields intended only for the ACP bridge by manipulating clie

  2. Jun 17, 2026 · NIST NVD

    Updated

    OpenClaw before 2026.3.28 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the chat.send gateway method where ACP-only provenance fields are gated by self-declared client metadata from WebSocket handshake rather than verified authorization state. Authenticated operator clients can spoof ACP identity labels and inject reserved provenance fields intended only for the ACP bridge by manipulating clie

Affected

  • cpe openclaw/openclawversion unspecified

Sources

  • CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-41299

    Official CVE identifier

    cve.org
  • NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2026-41299

    OpenClaw before 2026.3.28 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the chat.send gateway method where ACP-only provenance fields are gated by self-declared client metadata from WebSocket handshake rather than verified authorization state. Authenticated operator clients c

    nvd.nist.gov

References