Findings

CVE-2026-5501

wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf's signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untru…

Published Apr 10, 2026 · corrected/updated Jun 17, 2026 · wolfssl wolfssl · evidence confidence medium

wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf's signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let's Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject name with any public key and arbitrary signature bytes, and the function returns / . The native wolfSSL TLS handshake path ( ) is not susceptible and the issue is limited to applications using the OpenSSL compatibility API directly, which would include integrations of wolfSSL into nginx and haproxy.

Grounded briefings

Catalog interpretations for three audiences. Each brief cites ingested metadata and the original advisories below. They are not independent research and they do not invent exploit steps.

Executive

CVE-2026-5501 is a high public vulnerability record for wolfssl wolfssl. It is not currently listed in the CISA Known Exploited catalog. Check the linked vendor or CERT advisories for patch status. This summary is a catalog interpretation of the ingested metadata and cites the original advisories below.

System administrator

Identify whether wolfssl wolfssl is in your estate, then compare installed versions with the affected ranges. Affected packages or ranges on record: wolfssl/wolfssl. Check the linked vendor or CERT advisories for patch status. Prefer the vendor or distribution advisory linked in Sources before changing production systems. This is a catalog interpretation, not a runbook.

Security analyst

Signals on file: CVSS 8.6. It is not currently listed in the CISA Known Exploited catalog. Weakness classes: CWE-295. Sources contributing to this record: cve_org, nvd. Public exploit references, when present, are outbound links only and are not proof of active exploitation. This is a catalog interpretation of stored metadata.

Exploitation and remediation

  • Exploitation evidence

    Not listed as known exploited in CISA KEV. Not in CISA KEV or VulnCheck KEV.

  • Patch and remediation

    No required-action text is stored yet. Use the vendor or CERT links in Sources for patch availability.

  • Safe detection guidance

    Compare installed versions with the affected ranges below and verify the advisory from the original publisher. This site stores metadata and outbound links only; it does not ship exploit code or proof-of-concept payloads.

Technology hubs

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Apr 10, 2026 · NIST NVD

    Detected

    wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf's signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let's Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject n

  2. Jun 17, 2026 · NIST NVD

    Updated

    wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf's signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker who obtains any leaf certificate from a trusted CA (e.g. a free DV cert from Let's Encrypt) can forge a certificate for any subject n

Affected

  • cpe wolfssl/wolfsslversion unspecified

Sources

  • CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-5501

    Official CVE identifier

    cve.org
  • NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2026-5501

    wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert in the OpenSSL compatibility layer accepts a certificate chain in which the leaf's signature is not checked, if the attacker supplies an untrusted intermediate with Basic Constraints that is legitimately signed by a trusted root. An attacker wh

    nvd.nist.gov

References