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Findings

CVE-2026-88833

A flaw was found in BusyBox's udhcpc DHCP client.

Published Oct 13, 2026 · updated Oct 15, 2026

A flaw was found in BusyBox's udhcpc DHCP client. When processing raw DHCP packets, the client replaces the validated packet length with an attacker-controlled value from the IP header without re-validating the minimum size. This leads to an integer underflow when subtracting header sizes, causing a subsequent memory copy with a massively oversized length. An attacker on the same network segment can send a specially crafted packet to crash the DHCP client, resulting in denial of service and loss of network connectivity.

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

No public source repository is identified for this product.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Oct 13, 2026 · NIST NVD

    Detected

    A flaw was found in BusyBox's udhcpc DHCP client. When processing raw DHCP packets, the client replaces the validated packet length with an attacker-controlled value from the IP header without re-validating the minimum size. This leads to an integer underflow when subtracting header sizes, causing a subsequent memory copy with a massively oversized length. An attacker on the same network segment c

  2. Oct 15, 2026 · NIST NVD

    Updated

    A flaw was found in BusyBox's udhcpc DHCP client. When processing raw DHCP packets, the client replaces the validated packet length with an attacker-controlled value from the IP header without re-validating the minimum size. This leads to an integer underflow when subtracting header sizes, causing a subsequent memory copy with a massively oversized length. An attacker on the same network segment c

Sources

  • CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-88833

    Official CVE identifier

    cve.org
  • NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2026-88833

    A flaw was found in BusyBox's udhcpc DHCP client. When processing raw DHCP packets, the client replaces the validated packet length with an attacker-controlled value from the IP header without re-validating the minimum size. This leads to an integer underflow when subtracting hea

    nvd.nist.gov

References