Vulnerability · CVE-2026-10639
In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, o…
Published Jun 16, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 15, 2026 · the affected product
Check if you run it
No confirmed exploitation is on record for CVE-2026-10639. EPSS is 0.23%. Act only if a listed version of the affected product is installed.
Gaps on this record
- No plain product name is stored. The page cannot tell you which product to check.
- No version range is stored. A customer cannot check an installed version against this record.
- No vendor fix or required action is stored. Compare the linked advisory before you change production.
- Severity
- Medium4.8
- Known exploitation
- Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV
- EPSS
- 0.23%
- Remediation
- Advisory link
- Affected products
- cpe zephyrproject/zephyr
In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx -> net_if_tx -> L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can unref it to refcount 0 and return the struct net_pkt to its slab (net_pkt_unref -> k_mem_slab_free) before the stats line runs. net_core.c documents this exact contract ('the pkt might contain garbage already ... do not use pkt after that call'). The post-send net_pkt_iface(reply) therefore reads reply->iface out of a freed (and possibly already reallocated) net_pkt, a use-after-free read; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stats macro additionally increments a counter through that value, i.e. a dereference/write through a stale or recycled-slot pointer. The path is reached unauthenticated by any remote host that pings the device (net_icmpv4_input -> net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers -> icmpv4_handle_echo_request) and is gated on CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. Impact is a probabilistic read of recycled packet memory plus a possible wild-pointer write under a timing race, leading most likely to corrupted interface statistics or a remotely triggerable crash (DoS). The defect was introduced in 2019 (v1.14) and is present through v4.4.0. The companion change in net_icmpv4_send_error() is not a use-after-free because it reads net_pkt_iface(orig), the caller-owned received packet, which stays alive across the send. The fix caches the interface pointer from the live received packet before sending and uses it for the post-send stats updates.
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- cpe zephyrproject/zephyrversion unspecified
How to fix CVE-2026-10639
Recommended remediation
A patch or advisory reference is linked. Open the original publisher for availability by product version.
Official advisories
What to do
Three questions, each answered from this record only. Confirm the vendor advisory before you patch.
Should you patch?
No confirmed exploitation is on record for CVE-2026-10639. EPSS is 0.23%. Act only if a listed version of the affected product is installed.
Which versions are affected?
Affected version ranges are not on this record. Compare the installed version with the linked vendor advisory before you change production.
What should an analyst verify?
CWE-416: Use After Free. EPSS 0.23%. There is no CISA KEV listing. No Exploit-DB or Metasploit reference is linked. Use the source links for the original advisory.
Code
The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.
Timeline
Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.
Jun 16, 2026 · NIST NVD
Detected
In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx -> net_if_tx -> L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can
Oct 15, 2026 · NIST NVD
Updated
In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx -> net_if_tx -> L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can
Sources
- CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-10639
Official CVE identifier
cve.org - FIRST EPSSExploitation probabilityCVE-2026-10639
30-day exploitation probability 0.2%
first.org - NIST NVDVulnerability recordCVE-2026-10639
In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of rep
nvd.nist.gov
References
Freshness
Last verified in this catalog Oct 18, 2026. Significant claims (KEV, EPSS, CVSS, affected ranges) come from the source rows above — open the original publisher for the authoritative advisory.