Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability · CVE-2026-111922

Vikunja from 2.2.0 before 2.7.0 contains a permissive CORS configuration that trusts every localhost and 127.0.0.1 port with credentials, even when service.publicurl is set.

Published Oct 9, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 18, 2026 · Vikunja from 2.2.0 before

Open the advisory

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for CVE-2026-111922. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare Vikunja from 2.2.0 before with the linked advisory before you change production.

Severity

High7.2

Known exploitation

Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV

EPSS

Not in the current FIRST EPSS dataset

Remediation

Advisory link

Affected products

Go code.vikunja.io/api

## Summary Vikunja ships with defaulting to and , and sends , so a page served from any port on the user's own machine may make credentialed cross-origin requests to the API and read the responses. The mandatory is appended to that default list rather than replacing it, so a fully configured production deployment still trusts every localhost origin. Combined with the token refresh endpoint, which authenticates with the cookie and returns a bearer JWT in the response body, one from such a page yields a working access token for whoever is logged in, and from there the whole account. ## Vulnerability Details defaults to true and defaults to the two localhost wildcards: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/config/config.go#L495-L497 The middleware is registered with and an that implements the port wildcard through , since Echo v5 will not accept a wildcard port itself: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/routes/routes.go#L263-L281 The detail that turns a development convenience into a production exposure is the last line of configuration handling. Enabling CORS without a public URL is a fatal error, so every deployment sets one, and that value is *appended* to the origin list rather than substituted for it: https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/blob/a881ac39eecd07575a5aede8e74727c28d5fd578/pkg/config/config.go#L828-L830 An operator who configures nothing but their own hostname therefore ends up allowing three origins with credentials: their site, and any port on and . There is no supported configuration in which the localhost entries are quietly dropped, and nothing in the logs distinguishes the intended origin from the inherited ones. The escalation path is the refresh endpoint. It is deliberately unauthenticated because it authenticates with the refresh cookie instead of a bearer token, and it returns the new access token in the JSON body: https://github.com/go-vikun