Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability · CVE-2026-112938

filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a symbolic link swapped in at .filelock and creates claim files in a directory another local user chooses

Published Oct 28, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 28, 2026 · filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a

Last checked Nov 6, 2026. A connected source was read within the last 7 days.

Open the advisory

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for CVE-2026-112938. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a with the linked advisory before you change production.

Gaps on this record

  • The stored product name is a package slug. The name on this page is taken from the title (filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a).
  • No vendor fix or required action is stored. Compare the linked advisory before you change production.
  • EPSS is missing. A missing score is not a low risk.
Severity
Medium5.8
Known exploitation
Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV
EPSS
Not in the current FIRST EPSS dataset
Remediation
Version ranges on file
Affected products
pip filelock · pypi filelock

and check (the coordination directory that holds the lock's state) with one call on its name. reports what a name is without following a symbolic link (a file that redirects to another path). After that check, the code reaches by pathname for every later operation ( , scan, publish, link, unlink). passes (a flag that makes an open fail when the final name is a symbolic link), but the flag covers only the final component. The kernel follows a symbolic link in any earlier component. Another local user (the other user below) who can rename exchanges it for a symbolic link after the check. In a shared directory without the sticky bit (a directory flag that lets only a file's owner rename or remove it), any user with write access can do this. Where the shared directory is sticky, such as , only the user who created before the user running the lock (the lock user below) first used it can. The lock user's process (root's, if root takes the lock) then creates a directory and claim files (the files whose presence says a process wants or holds the lock) inside a directory the other user chooses but only the lock user can write. When the link points at another strict lock's directory, the stranded claims make that lock time out for every process until an operator finds and force-breaks each one. The property and resolve the same path with no check at all. Affected versions: filelock >= 3.30.0 and <= 4.2.0 (finding ). ## Severity **CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H, 5.8 (Medium).** (local): the other user needs an account on the same host. (high attack complexity): the swap must land between the and the next . The other user does not aim at that window. It flips the name in a loop with (a system call that swaps two names in one step) across repeated acquires, and won after 1 to 31 runs of the lock user's program in the scanner's trials. A sticky directory also requires it to have created first. (low privileges): an unprivileged account is enough. (no user interaction

Are you affected?

Enter the version you run. The result uses only the ranges stored on this record.

The check returns affected, not affected, or incomplete. It does not guess a version that is missing from the record.

  • pip filelock>= 3.30.0, <= 4.2.0
  • pypi filelockversion unspecified

How to fix CVE-2026-112938

What to do

Three questions, each answered from this record only. Confirm the vendor advisory before you patch.

Should you patch?

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for CVE-2026-112938. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a with the linked advisory before you change production.

Which versions are affected?

Compare what you have installed with >= 3.30.0, <= 4.2.0. Compare the installed version with the linked vendor advisory before you change production.

What should an analyst verify?

CWE-363. EPSS is absent from the current FIRST dataset. There is no CISA KEV listing. No Exploit-DB or Metasploit reference is linked. Use the source links for the original advisory.

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Oct 28, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Detected

    and check (the coordination directory that holds the lock's state) with one call on its name. reports what a name is without following a symbolic link (a file that redirects to another path). After that check, the code reaches by pathname for every later operation ( , scan, publish, link, unlink). passes (a flag that makes an open fail when the final name is a symbolic link), but the flag covers o

  2. Oct 28, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Updated

    and check (the coordination directory that holds the lock's state) with one call on its name. reports what a name is without following a symbolic link (a file that redirects to another path). After that check, the code reaches by pathname for every later operation ( , scan, publish, link, unlink). passes (a flag that makes an open fail when the final name is a symbolic link), but the flag covers o

Sources

  • CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-112938

    Official CVE identifier

    cve.org
  • GitHub Advisory DatabasePackage advisoryGHSA-m462-7rxw-wvpg

    filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a symbolic link swapped in at .filelock and creates claim files in a directory another local user chooses

    github.com
  • GitLab Advisory DatabasePackage advisoryCVE-2026-112938

    StrictSoftFileLock and AsyncStrictSoftFileLock check .filelock (the coordination directory that holds the lock's state) with one lstat call on its name. lstat reports what a name is without following a symbolic link (a file that redirects to another path). After that check, the code reaches .filelock/claims by pathname for every later operation (mkdir, scan, publish, link, unlink). _open_directory

    advisories.gitlab.com

References

Freshness

Last verified in this catalog Nov 6, 2026. Significant claims (KEV, EPSS, CVSS, affected ranges) come from the source rows above — open the original publisher for the authoritative advisory.

  • GitLab Advisory DatabaseOct 30, 2026
  • CVE.orgOct 29, 2026
  • GitHub Advisory DatabaseOct 29, 2026