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Vulnerabilities

Security research · CVE-2026-114076

Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook

Published Oct 2, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 21, 2026 · Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via

Open the advisory

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for CVE-2026-114076. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via with the linked advisory before you change production.

Gaps on this record

  • The stored product name is a package slug. The name on this page is taken from the title (Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via).
  • No vendor fix or required action is stored. Compare the linked advisory before you change production.
  • EPSS is missing. A missing score is not a low risk.
Severity
Medium5.4
Known exploitation
Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV
EPSS
Awaiting synchronization with FIRST
Remediation
Advisory link
Affected products
npm trigger.dev

### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied . When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server ( -> ) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via . The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for , , , , returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or and the multi-tenant server fetches it. ### Affected , HEAD (current main). ### Root cause - Source (API route): (no host validation); route (PAT-auth). - Store: persists verbatim. - Sink: ; identical at . Runs inside the webapp process; follows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere. ### Runtime PoC (proven on self-host) Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with (an internal address from the server's POV) + a DEPLOYING deployment. Triggered via the public API -> 200 -> FAILED -> alertsWorker -> the server fetched the listener. Captured: The webapp server (user-agent: node) made an outbound POST to the attacker-chosen internal URL; 169.254.169.254 / any internal host works identically. ### Severity ~ Medium. Blind (response not reflected) + POST-only (fixed body = signed alert payload), so it enables internal port/host scanning (delivery success/timing oracle), state-changing POSTs to internal services, and IMDSv1-via-redirect — not arbitrary GET exfiltration. PR:L (authenticated tenant). Egress private-IP/metadata blocking on server-issued webhooks is industry standard; its absence is the defect. ### Suggested fix Validate the webhook URL on create (require http(s), resolve host, reject private/link-local/loopback/metadata ranges) AND re-check at fetch time (re-resolve after redirects or disable redirects / pin to resolved public IP). A shared used by + the two delivery sinks. ### Dup Distinct CWE-918 class from the IDOR advisories. FRESH. (The Grav maintainer i

Are you affected?

Enter the version you run. The result uses only the ranges stored on this record.

The check returns affected, not affected, or incomplete. It does not guess a version that is missing from the record.

  • npm trigger.dev0 → 4.5.2

How to fix CVE-2026-114076

What to do

Three questions, each answered from this record only. Confirm the vendor advisory before you patch.

Should you patch?

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for CVE-2026-114076. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via with the linked advisory before you change production.

Which versions are affected?

Compare what you have installed with 0 → 4.5.2. Compare the installed version with the linked vendor advisory before you change production.

What should an analyst verify?

CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). EPSS is not on this record yet. There is no CISA KEV listing. No Exploit-DB or Metasploit reference is linked. Use the source links for the original advisory.

Code

The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.

Timeline

Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.

  1. Oct 2, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Detected

    ### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied . When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server ( -> ) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via . The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for , , , , returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just (no syntax check at all).

  2. Oct 21, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Fix available

    trigger.dev fixed in 4.5.2

  3. Oct 21, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Fix available

    trigger.dev fixed in 4.5.2

  4. Oct 21, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database

    Updated

    ### Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied . When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server ( -> ) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via . The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for , , , , returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just (no syntax check at all).

Sources

References

Freshness

Last verified in this catalog Oct 21, 2026. Significant claims (KEV, EPSS, CVSS, affected ranges) come from the source rows above — open the original publisher for the authoritative advisory.