Security research · CVE-2026-114079
Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel
Published Oct 2, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 21, 2026 · Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel
Last checked Oct 26, 2026. A connected source was read within the last 7 days.
Check if you run it
No confirmed exploitation is on record for CVE-2026-114079. EPSS is 0.22%. Act only if a listed version of Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel is installed.
Gaps on this record
- The stored product name is a package slug. The name on this page is taken from the title (Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel).
- No vendor fix or required action is stored. Compare the linked advisory before you change production.
- Severity
- Medium5.4
- Known exploitation
- Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV
- EPSS
- 0.22%
- Remediation
- Advisory link
- Affected products
- npm trigger.dev
### Summary Trigger.dev isolates each project into multiple **environments** ( , , , and per-PR branches), each with its **own secret API key** — the environment is a trust boundary (a /preview/CI key is lower-trust than a key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment ( ). The deployment **cancel** path does not. scopes the lookup by ** only** — never — so a secret key for *any* environment in a project can cancel a deployment belonging to *any other* environment of the same project, including **production**. The deployment **GET** route, by contrast, *is* env-scoped — so the same key that is **404'd when trying to read** a prod deployment can nonetheless **cancel** it. That asymmetry is the bug. ### Affected , HEAD (current ). Affects self-hosted and cloud. ### Root cause authenticates to an environment and calls . : accepts but its type is literally — it discards the environment identity. blocks only , so any in-progress deployment ( / / / ) is cancellable. **Contrast — the correctly env-scoped sibling** (GET): Reads are env-scoped; the cancel mutation is not. The same helper also backs the deployment *progress* methods ( ), so the projectId-only scope is a small class. ### Runtime PoC (proven on the self-host stack) Seeded one project with a env (key ) and a env (key ) and one ( , status ) in the **prod** env. As the **dev** key: The dev key cannot *read* the prod deployment (404) yet *cancels* it (204 → CANCELED); a different project's key is correctly 404'd — so the gap is precisely cross-environment within a project.
Are you affected?
Enter the version you run. The result uses only the ranges stored on this record.
The check returns affected, not affected, or incomplete. It does not guess a version that is missing from the record.
- npm trigger.dev0 → 4.5.6
How to fix CVE-2026-114079
Upgrade
CVE-2026-114079 lists a fix boundary at 4.5.6. Compare the installed build with that boundary before you change production.
Version check
Fixed in 4.5.6
Advisory
Open the cve_org record and follow its fix.
Official advisories
What to do
Three questions, each answered from this record only. Confirm the vendor advisory before you patch.
Should you patch?
No confirmed exploitation is on record for CVE-2026-114079. EPSS is 0.22%. Act only if a listed version of Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel is installed.
Which versions are affected?
Compare what you have installed with 0 → 4.5.6. Compare the installed version with the linked vendor advisory before you change production.
What should an analyst verify?
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. EPSS 0.22%. There is no CISA KEV listing. No Exploit-DB or Metasploit reference is linked. Use the source links for the original advisory.
Code
The project this record applies to. Exploit listings stay in References.
Timeline
Detection, updates, and resolution for this record.
Oct 2, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database
Detected
### Summary Trigger.dev isolates each project into multiple **environments** ( , , , and per-PR branches), each with its **own secret API key** — the environment is a trust boundary (a /preview/CI key is lower-trust than a key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment ( ). The deployment **cancel** path does not. scopes the lookup by ** only*
Oct 21, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database
Fix available
trigger.dev fixed in 4.5.6
Oct 21, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database
Fix available
trigger.dev fixed in 4.5.6
Oct 21, 2026 · GitHub Advisory Database
Updated
### Summary Trigger.dev isolates each project into multiple **environments** ( , , , and per-PR branches), each with its **own secret API key** — the environment is a trust boundary (a /preview/CI key is lower-trust than a key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment ( ). The deployment **cancel** path does not. scopes the lookup by ** only*
Sources
- CVE.orgVulnerability recordCVE-2026-114079
Official CVE identifier
cve.org - FIRST EPSSExploitation probabilityCVE-2026-114079
30-day exploitation probability 0.22%
first.org - GitHub Advisory DatabasePackage advisoryGHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62
GitHub Advisory Database record mirrored by OSV.
github.com - OpenSSF OSV / OSV ScannerPackage advisoryGHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62
Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel
osv.dev
References
Freshness
Last verified in this catalog Oct 26, 2026. Significant claims (KEV, EPSS, CVSS, affected ranges) come from the source rows above — open the original publisher for the authoritative advisory.
- FIRST EPSSOct 23, 2026
- CVE.orgOct 21, 2026
- GitHub Advisory DatabaseOct 21, 2026
- OpenSSF OSV / OSV ScannerOct 21, 2026