Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability · CVE-2026-53552

Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers

Published Jul 7, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 27, 2026 · Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and

Last checked Oct 30, 2026. A connected source was read within the last 7 days.

Check if you run it

No confirmed exploitation is on record for CVE-2026-53552. EPSS is 0.35%. Act only if a listed version of Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and is installed.

Severity

Critical9.6

Known exploitation

Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV

EPSS

0.35%

Remediation

Advisory link

Affected products

Go github.com/zhenorzz/goploy

### Summary , , , and in accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding and queries filter only by row id. A user holding the role (or any role that includes the / permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because runs on the project's working tree. ### Affected HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the Docker image ( ). The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API. ### Vulnerable code (creates file under any project's directory; body controls ): (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row): (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id): (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs in the project working tree): filters only by row id, no namespace join: checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to : ### Reachable Any logged-in user assigned the role in their own namespace can call , , , and . The seeded role ( ) is granted both ( ) and ( ) by . Multi-tenant deployments typically assign to each tenant's project owner; once a tenant's manager holds these permissions in their own namespace, they hold them globally for these four endpoints. ### Proof of concept Setup against the published Docker image: Set up two namespaces and two non-super-manager users, each assigned (role_id=1) only in their own namespace: Negative control: Bob's own namespace has no projects. Exploit 1 — Bob overwrites Alice's file content: Exploit 2 — Bob plants a new file in Alice's project directory: Exploit 3 — Bob deletes Alice's file: Exploit 4 — Bob rewrites Alice's project git remot