Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability · CVE-2026-83531

Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language I…

Published Oct 19, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 20, 2026 · the affected product

Open the advisory

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for CVE-2026-83531. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare the affected product with the linked advisory before you change production.

Severity

High8.8

Known exploitation

Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV

EPSS

Awaiting synchronization with FIRST

Remediation

Advisory link

Affected products

See sources for product scope

Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an Expression Language Statement ('Expression Language Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.4.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The dynamic-router-control endpoint, introduced in 4.4.0, lets routing participants manage Dynamic Router subscriptions by sending control messages. When it handled a subscribe or update request, DynamicRouterControlProducer took the subscription predicate and the name of the language used to compile it from the incoming message, either from the predicate and expressionLanguage fields of a DynamicRouterControlMessage body or from the CamelDynamicRouterPredicate and CamelDynamicRouterExpressionLanguage headers. DynamicRouterControlService then resolved that language from the CamelContext and compiled the expression into a Predicate, with no allow-list and no opt-in. The compiled predicate was added to the channel's rule base and evaluated against every exchange routed through the corresponding dynamic-router endpoint for as long as the subscription existed. A route that forwards messages from an external transport to the control endpoint, as shown in the component documentation for routing participants in other JVMs or applications, therefore let any actor able to send a message on that transport supply an expression of their choosing, which was evaluated with the privileges of the Camel process. Any expression language available on the classpath could be selected, including the simple language, which is always present and was the default on the header path, so removing optional expression languages from the classpath did not prevent the issue. Exploitation requires the ability to send a message on a transport whose route forwards it to a dynamic-router-control endpoint; no other authentication or user interaction is needed. Releases before 4.4.0 are not affected, because their

No affected version ranges are stored yet. Use the vendor advisory before you decide this record does not apply.