Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability · GHSA-w9x9-j56r-h98r

@eeacms/volto-chatbot has Unauthenticated Danswer API Confused Deputy Proxy

Published Oct 29, 2026 · catalog updated Oct 29, 2026 · @eeacms/volto-chatbot has Unauthenticated Danswer

Last checked Oct 30, 2026. A connected source was read within the last 7 days.

Open the advisory

Exploitation likelihood is not on this record for GHSA-w9x9-j56r-h98r. A missing EPSS score is not a low risk. Compare @eeacms/volto-chatbot has Unauthenticated Danswer with the linked advisory before you change production.

Severity

High8.2

Known exploitation

Not in CISA/VulnCheck KEV

EPSS

Awaiting synchronization with FIRST

Remediation

Version ranges on file

Affected products

npm @eeacms/volto-chatbot

## Unauthenticated Danswer API Confused Deputy Proxy in @eeacms/volto-chatbot ### Summary exposes an Express middleware route ( ) that accepts unauthenticated HTTP requests from any network client and proxies them to the configured upstream Danswer API, automatically attaching the server-side service credentials ( or session cookie). Because no authorization check, path allowlist, or method restriction is applied before the upstream request is issued, an unauthenticated attacker can invoke arbitrary Danswer API operations — including privileged admin endpoints — as the configured service account. This is a classic Confused Deputy attack: the Volto proxy acts as a deputy that carries credentials on behalf of the attacker. ### Details The vulnerability is introduced across two source files in . **Route registration ( ):** The wildcard pattern matches every HTTP method and any sub-path, and no authentication middleware is chained before . This means all requests reaching any path are forwarded without any identity check. **Unvalidated path extraction and upstream URL construction ( ):** The attacker-controlled is transformed into the upstream Danswer path with a simple string replace. There is no allowlist of permitted paths, no restriction on HTTP methods, and no validation of the resulting URL. The attacker therefore fully controls which Danswer endpoint is called and with which HTTP method. **Credential attachment and forwarding ( , , ):** After constructing the URL from attacker-supplied input, the middleware attaches the server-side Danswer credentials (either a cached login session cookie or a API key) and dispatches the request. The response from Danswer is then relayed back to the unauthenticated client. **Complete data flow (source → sink):** 1. — all paths registered to with no auth guard (source: external HTTP request). 2. — used directly to derive the upstream path without allowlist. 3. — attacker-controlled path appended to . 4. / — server-side session coo